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Detecting Dangling Pointers Using Embedded Metadata
ABSTRACT
When the memory for an object is deallocated, pointers to that object become invalid.
Such pointers, known as dangling pointers, can be exploited by attackers to cause undesirable or
malicious program behavior. A pointer that points to memory that has been reused (reallocated)
is known as a use-after-free pointer; these, too, are gateways to exploits. This disclosure
describes techniques to detect the presence of dangling and use-after-free pointers in runtime
and, upon detection, forestall security breaches due to such pointers by causing a program crash
accompanied by a bug report. Per the techniques, both pointer and pointed-to object are
augmented with metadata that enables, upon dereferencing, the checking of the validity of the
pointer and the re-use status of the memory it points to.
KEYWORDS
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● Use-after-free memory
● Use-after-free attack
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BACKGROUND
When the memory for an object is deallocated, pointers to that object become invalid.
Such pointers, known as dangling pointers, can be exploited by attackers to cause undesirable or
malicious program behavior. A pointer that points to memory that has been reused (reallocated)
is known as a use-after-free pointer; these, too, are gateways to exploits.
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DESCRIPTION
This disclosure describes techniques that detect the presence of dangling and use-afterfree pointers in runtime and, upon detection, cause a program crash, which may be preferable to
leaving open the potential for security breaches. The program crash is accompanied by a bug
report, enabling the debugging of memory errors, typically difficult to debug.
Per the techniques, a new pointer type, CheckedPtr<T>, is defined as follows.
class CheckedPtr<T> {
const word_t generation;
const CheckedPointee<T>* ptr;
};

Here, CheckedPointee<T> is the object being pointed to, and generation is a piece of
metadata, further described below, that indicates the re-use status and (in)validity of the allocated
memory. CheckedPointee<T>, the object being pointed to, is also augmented with the same
metadata as follows.
class CheckedPointee<T> {
const word_t generation;
const T value;
};
class PointeeObject : public Mixin { ... };

class PointeeObject : public CheckedPointee,
public Mixin { ... };

class Mixin { ... };
class Mixin : public CheckedPointee { ... };
class Foo {
PointeeObject* pointee_;
Mixin* mixin_;
};

(a)

class Foo {
CheckedPtr<PointeeObject> pointee_;
CheckedPtr<Mixin> mixin_;
};

(b)

Fig. 1: Enabling CheckedPtrs. (a) code with ordinary pointers (b) code with CheckedPtrs
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As illustrated in Fig. 1, to enable validity-checking and/or reused-memory checking, a
programmer uses CheckedPtrs instead of ordinary pointers. There is no other change in the
implementation language. Changes to code can be made incrementally, e.g., some pointer
variables in a program can be of type CheckedPtrs while others remain normal pointers.
When memory is allocated to an object of class CheckedPointee, its generation field is
initialized to a unique valid value. When a CheckedPtr is made to point to that object, its
generation field is set equal to the generation field of the object. When the memory is

deallocated, the generation field of the object is set to an invalid value.
If the memory is allocated, then deallocated, then again reallocated, the generation field
of the object upon reallocation is to set it to a valid value different from the valid value that was
given upon allocation. One way to ensure that the generation value is unique to each
reallocation is to monotonically increase generation value with each reallocation. (Hence
generation is also referred to as sequence number.) However, to make it harder for attackers,
generation can also be assigned a new random value upon each reallocation.

When a CheckedPtr is dereferenced, e.g., its contents accessed, its generation field is
compared to the generation field of the object it points to (CheckedPointee). If there is a
mismatch in the two generation fields, or if the generation field of CheckedPointee is
invalid, a bug report is generated and a runtime error is thrown. Comparing two generation
fields can amount to such computationally inexpensive operations as bit-rotations, bit-masking,
and bitwise AND operations.
The generation field enables distinguishing between valid accesses, reused memory,
and deallocated memory as follows.
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Valid access
A pointer dereferencing, e.g., an access of the pointer contents, is valid if its generation
field matches the generation field of the object it points to:
CheckedPtr.generation == CheckedPointee.generation

Reused memory
A pointer dereferencing, e.g., an access of the pointer contents, can detect re-used
memory and can throw an error if its generation field has a mismatch with the generation field of
the object it points to:
CheckedPtr.generation != CheckedPointee.generation

Invalid access (deallocated memory)
A pointer dereferencing, e.g., an access of the pointer contents, is invalid if the
generation field of the object it points to is invalid:
!IsValid(CheckedPointee.generation)

The contents of deallocated memory depend on the underlying memory allocator. For
example, in some memory allocators, the first word of a deallocated slot includes an encoded
pointer to the next free-list element, which has a known structure (in particular, the high-order
bits have a known value, per the architecture and operating system requirements). This can be
used to ensure that deallocated memory does not include a generation value that is valid.

Fig. 2: Using the upper 16 bits of a 64-bit architecture to store the generation field of a
CheckedPtr with zero overhead
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In a typical 64-it architecture, the upper 16 bits (bits 64-48) are typically set to zero, since
the widest memory space is only 48 bits wide (corresponding to an addressable space of 248=280
TB). As illustrated in Fig. 2, these upper 16 bits can be used to encode the generation field of
CheckedPtr, thereby enabling a 16-bit generation field with zero memory overhead for the

pointer. Additionally, due to the nature of the C/C++ malloc() library function, which aligns
memory allocated by it, the lower 3 bits are zero as well. This enables up to a 21-bit generation
field without any size overhead on the pointer side. As illustrated in Fig. 3 below,
CheckedPointee, the pointed-to object, continues to have a one-word overhead.

Fig. 3: Partitioning a page to include CheckedPointees

Fig. 3 illustrates the partitioning of a page to hold objects of type CheckedPointee.
CheckedPtr (in green) is made to point to the one-word generation field (pink), which can be

placed adjacent to the pointed-to object (yellow).
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(a)

(b)

Fig. 4: A CheckedPtr that can point to the interior of an object (a) page partition (b) structure of
the CheckedPtr

Fig. 4 illustrates a variant of CheckedPtr that can point to the interior (e.g., not
necessarily to the start) of an object. Fig. 4(a) illustrates a page partition that holds the pointed-to
object. Fig. 4(b) illustrates the structure of CheckedPtr: bits 64-48 are divided into the
previously-described generation field and an offset field that indicates the point within the
pointed-to object that CheckedPtr points to. The described variant of CheckedPtr can point to
the middle of complex data structures such as vectors, linked lists, etc.
In this manner, the techniques of this disclosure forestall security breaches due to
dangling or use-after-free pointers. The techniques require no change in the implementation
language, require no atomic instructions, cause no pointer chasing, can be added incrementally,
and have minimal memory (one word for the pointed-at object) and runtime overhead. The
described techniques can be implemented in software such as browsers, operating systems, etc.
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CONCLUSION
This disclosure describes techniques to detect the presence of dangling and use-after-free
pointers in runtime and, upon detection, forestall security breaches due to such pointers by
causing a program crash accompanied by a bug report. Per the techniques, both pointer and
pointed-to object are augmented with metadata that enables, upon dereferencing, the checking of
the validity of the pointer and the re-use status of the memory it points to.
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